Payroll Diversion Fraud Investigation

Payday arrived and an employee’s direct deposit never did. The money went to an account a criminal set up weeks ago, and by the time anyone noticed, it was gone. E3 Legacy Intel investigates payroll diversion fraud: we find how the direct deposit change got in, trace where the pay went, identify who is behind it, and build the evidence for recovery and legal action. Licensed investigators, FL A-1400197. Report it within the first 72 hours.

How a Paycheck Gets Stolen Before Payday

Payroll diversion is business email compromise aimed at HR instead of the wire room. The criminal's goal is simple: change an employee's direct deposit destination to an account they control, then wait for the next pay run.

They get there by one of three doors. The first is the employee's own credentials, phished through a fake login page for your HR or payroll portal; once inside the self-service account, the criminal changes the bank details directly and often adds a rule to hide the confirmation email. The second is impersonation: an email to HR or payroll staff that appears to come from the employee, politely asking to update their direct deposit, usually to a prepaid card account that is hard to claw back. The third is compromise of an HR or payroll administrator's own account, which lets the criminal change many employees at once.

Each theft is smaller than a wire fraud loss, one paycheck instead of one closing, but the scheme repeats. The same criminal hits multiple employees, multiple pay cycles, or multiple companies running the same payroll platform. The question that matters on day one is whether you are looking at one compromised employee or a compromised HR system, because the containment, the loss, and the notification obligations are different. That is the first question this investigation answers.

The First 72 Hours

STEP 1

Call your bank and the payroll processor now

Report the deposits as fraudulent and ask about ACH reversal and a freeze on the receiving account. ACH windows are narrow and bank-dependent; hours matter.

STEP 2

File at FBI IC3

Report at ic3.gov. Payroll diversions are usually below wire-recall thresholds, but the report creates the federal record that recovery, insurance, and any later prosecution build on.

STEP 3

Freeze payroll changes

Suspend self-service bank-detail changes and require verified, out-of-band confirmation for every pending change. Assume more fraudulent changes are already queued for the next run.

STEP 4

Preserve everything

The change-request emails with full headers, portal logs showing who changed what and from where, the receiving account details, and the affected employees' phishing emails if they exist. Do not let IT wipe and reset before the evidence is captured.

STEP 5

Call an investigator

Your payroll provider will fix the record going forward. Establishing how the criminal got in, whether other accounts are compromised, and where the money went is investigative work nobody in that chain performs.

The Question That Decides Everything: One Employee or the System

If a single employee was phished, the exposure is one person's pay and the fix is contained. If an HR administrator's account or the payroll platform itself was compromised, every employee's bank details, Social Security numbers, and home addresses may have been exposed, and that raises breach notification questions your counsel must answer on a deadline. We establish the scope with evidence: portal access logs, mailbox audit records, and the pattern of changed accounts. Guessing small and being wrong is the expensive outcome; our job is to make sure nobody is guessing.

The fraudulent change traced to how it got in

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Access determination

We establish how the fraudulent change entered: phished employee credentials, an impersonation email to HR, or a compromised administrator account, and we preserve the proof.

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Tenant and portal review

Where we have access, we review the HR platform's change logs and the Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace audit trail: sign-ins, inbox rules, forwarding, and OAuth grants that show the intrusion and its duration.

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Fund tracing and unmasking

We trace the diverted pay through the receiving accounts, document each hop, and work to identify who is behind the accounts and the emails for recovery and referral.

The Recovery Path

Individual paychecks move by ACH, so the recovery mechanics differ from wire fraud: reversal requests through the originating bank, holds on the receiving account, and the receiving institution's own fraud process. Where the same receiving accounts appear across multiple victims, law enforcement interest rises sharply, and our documentation is built to make that case. Civil routes exist against identified account holders, and employer practices liability or crime coverage may respond depending on the policy; the coverage question usually turns on exactly the access evidence we document. No investigator can promise recovery. What we deliver is the documented intrusion, the traced funds, and the identified parties that give every recovery channel something to act on.

Who Makes the Employee Whole

In most payroll diversion cases the employer re-issues the stolen pay, then pursues recovery, because the employee did nothing but get phished, and wage payment obligations do not disappear because a criminal intervened. Either way, the dispute over the loss lands on the evidence: who was compromised, what controls existed, and what the logs show. That record is what we build.

When the Fraud Is Bigger Than Your Company

Payroll diversion is rarely bespoke. The same operators run the same play against many employers at once, often targeting companies on the same payroll platform with the same phishing kit and the same look-alike login pages. That has two practical consequences for your case. First, the receiving accounts in your incident have usually received other companies' payroll too, and documenting that overlap is what elevates a small-dollar theft into a case law enforcement will work: one diverted paycheck is a report, a mule account collecting from a dozen employers is a prosecution. Second, the infrastructure that hit you, the domains, the sending addresses, the kit fingerprints, is searchable, and it tells us how industrial the operation is and where else it points. We document your loss inside that larger pattern, which strengthens every channel you care about: the bank sees an account worth freezing, the insurer sees a professional attack rather than lax controls, and the federal file gets weight it would never have alone.

Written for whoever absorbs the loss

HR and payroll leaders who found the fraudulent changes
CFOs and controllers absorbing the loss
Corporate counsel weighing notification obligations
Small businesses hit through an outsourced payroll platform
Employees whose credentials were phished

Stay Protected

✅

Out-of-band change verification

Every direct deposit change gets confirmed with the employee by voice or in person before the next run, through contact details already on file, never those in the request.

📡

Post-incident monitoring

For 90 days after remediation we watch for re-compromise, credential reuse against your HR platform, and new look-alike login domains targeting your employees.

How These Cases Are Priced

Every engagement is a flat fee, quoted in writing before work begins, so a payroll incident never becomes an open-ended bill. As a framework, insurance claim evaluations start at 5,400 dollars, and full business email compromise investigations, the family this belongs to, typically run 12,500 to 25,000 dollars depending on how many mailboxes, employees, and accounts are involved. Complex multi-company or platform-level matters are quoted beyond that range. These figures are frameworks, never final quotes: your quote comes from your facts. Contact us to have your case evaluated and quoted.

Frequently Asked Questions

An employee's direct deposit went to a fraudulent account. Can the money be recovered?
Sometimes, and speed decides it. Report the fraudulent deposit to your bank and payroll processor immediately, ask about ACH reversal and a hold on the receiving account, and file at the FBI IC3. We trace where the pay went and identify the receiving accounts, which is what reversals, claims, and legal action are built on.
How did a criminal change the direct deposit without anyone noticing?
One of three ways: they phished the employee's HR portal login and changed it themselves, they emailed HR pretending to be the employee, or they compromised a payroll administrator's account. They usually hide the confirmation email with a mailbox rule, so nobody sees it until payday fails.
Is this a data breach we have to report, or just a theft?
It depends on what was accessed, and that is a factual question. If only one employee's credentials were phished, the exposure is narrow. If an administrator account or the payroll platform was compromised, personal data for many employees may have been exposed. We establish the scope with logs and audit records so your counsel decides on evidence, not guesswork.
Does the employer have to pay the employee again?
Wage obligations generally survive the theft, and most employers re-issue the pay and pursue recovery, but the answer for your situation belongs with your employment counsel. What we contribute is the evidence: how the change got in, what controls were bypassed, and where the money went.
Why involve a private investigator when the payroll company is already looking at it?
The payroll provider corrects the record going forward and protects its own platform. Nobody in that chain traces the stolen funds, establishes how the intrusion happened, identifies who is behind the receiving accounts, or builds a file your insurer, your counsel, and law enforcement can act on. That is the investigator's job.
How much does a payroll diversion investigation cost?
Flat fee, quoted in writing before work begins. As a framework, business email compromise investigations typically run 12,500 to 25,000 dollars, and insurance claim evaluations start at 5,400 dollars. These are frameworks, never final quotes. Contact us to have your case evaluated and quoted.

Your Examiner

Matt Aubin, CDFE, FBCI

Managing Partner, E3 Legacy Intel · FL Licensed Investigator A-1400197

Every matter on this page is worked under a named, licensed examiner. Matt Aubin brings seventeen years in cybercrime and open source intelligence. He is a Certified Digital Forensics Examiner (CDFE), a Florida Board Certified Investigator (FBCI), and a Certified AI Agent Developer, and he has investigated cases jointly with the FBI, the SEC, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Marshals.

His work has been featured on ABC News, Spectrum News, and The Daily Beast, and in a television pilot for Netflix and MAC Pictures as a cybercrime expert. He keynotes nationally and serves on the Board of Directors of the Florida Association of Licensed Investigators (FALI). About Matt Aubin

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